India and the New Great Game in Central Asia
Dr Moonis
Ahmar *
Abstract
The phrase "Great Game" is commonly ascribed to the contest for
imperial dominance in Central Asia. The focus of the Anglo-Russian rivalry
during the 19th century was the strategic competition known as the "Great
Game" in Central Asia. Following Russian expansion and territorial
annexation of Central Asia, the Czarist Russian Empire wanted to penetrate into
Afghanistan. The British controlled Balochistan areas of Pakistan so as to get
easy access to the warm waters of Arabian Sea. That led to the outbreak of the
Anglo-Russian ‘Great Game’ which settled on recognising Afghanistan as a buffer
between Czarist and British Empires. Reconnecting Central and South Asia is a
challenge and is also an opportunity because India as a core regional power has
age-old ambitions to deepen its influence in what was called as ‘Turkestan.’
This paper will dwell at length on the role of India’s policy oriented think
tanks, research centers and universities in reaching out to Central Asia and
how the assumption of power by the Taliban in Kabul in August 2021 tends to
shape New Delhi’s grand strategy and designs in Central Asia. The paper will
also examine how Central Asia formulates India’s strategic thought process and
to what extent China and India are competitors in that region on pragmatic
grounds.
Keywords: Great Game, Central Asia, Modi, Extremism,
Terrorism, SCO,
TAPI, CASA
* Dr Moonis Ahmar is Meritorious Professor of
International Relations and former Dean
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi. He can be
reached at
amoonis@hotmail.com
__________________
@2023 by the
Islamabad Policy Research Institute. IPRI
Journal n XXIII (2): 111-129
https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.230205
Introduction borders between
British India and Afghanistan with the Wakhan hree Anglo-Afghan wars
(1839-1842, 1878-1880, 1919) settled
Corridor as a buffer between Russian and British Empires. Central
Asia, which before Russian
expansion, was connected with the Indian Subcontinent for centuries, lost its
linkages with its neighbourhood. The Soviet and Chinese occupation of greater
Central Asia on the one hand and the consolidation of British rule in India
made it difficult for the people of the two regions to freely interact with
each other. That was the price which the people of Central Asia and the
subcontinent had to pay for the ‘Great Game’ between the Russian and the
British empires. The gradual mitigation of connectivity between the Soviet
Union, China, Central Asia and British India, the age-old cultural, religious
and trade ties between the two regions were ruptured.
Following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the geopolitical dynamics in Central Asia witnessed the
inclusion of two additional actors, namely China and the United States, in what
is sometimes referred to as the "Great Game." Currently, India, being
the fifth largest economy globally, seeks to enhance its presence in the oil
and gas abundant region of Central Asia. However, India's aspirations face a
challenge due to a perceived obstruction by Pakistan, since New Delhi feels
that Islamabad is impeding India's access to Central Asia. The visit of the
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to all the Central Asian states in 2015 was
widely regarded as a significant step in strengthening the relationship between
New Delhi and Central Asia, as well as fostering closer connections between the
two regions.
Reconnecting Central and South
Asia is a challenge and is also an opportunity because India as a core regional
power has age-old ambitions to deepen its influence in what was called as
‘Turkestan.’[1]
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of new Central Asian
republics emerged, and the term ‘Great Game’ got a new impetus. India as a
close Soviet friend has certainly an edge vis-à-vis Pakistan as far as Central
Asia is concerned. Sharing perceptions of Central Asian states on combating
extremism, separatism and terrorism, India made use of its clout in
strengthening understanding to deal with the aforementioned threats. One can
question the credentials of Modi’s regime on secularism, but the secular mode
of governance of Central Asian regimes is also termed as a plus point in
Indo-Central Asian ties.
[1] With the advancement of
the policy of ‘Russification’ a major part of Central Asia was called as
Russian Turkestan and with the Chinese absorption of the remaining part of it
was called as the Chinese Turkestan.
This study aims to analyse the
dynamics of India and the emerging geopolitical competition in Central Asia,
sometimes referred to as the "new Great Game." The analysis will
primarily revolve around four key themes:
1.
India’s strategic, economic and political
interests.
2.
India’s grand strategy.
3.
Pakistan as a factor in India’s age-old design.
4. Facilitation
of India’s role in Central Asia by Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Furthermore, the paper will dwell at length on the role of
India’s policy oriented think tanks, research centers and universities in
reaching out to Central Asia and how the assumption of power by the Taliban in
Kabul in August 2021, tends to shape New Delhi’s grand strategy and designs in
Central Asia. The paper will also examine how Central Asia formulates
India’s strategic thought process
and to what extent China and India are competitors in that region on pragmatic
grounds.
The Centrality of Great Game
The term "Great Game"[1] pertains
to the historical competition that took place between Tsarist Russia and the
British Empire in the regions of the Indian Subcontinent and Central Asia. It
was initially coined by Arthur Connolly, an officer of the East India Company.
However, it gained widespread recognition through its inclusion in Rudyard
Kipling's novel Kim, which was
published in 1901. During this particular era, British officials harboured
apprehension and preoccupation with the expanding influence of Tsarist Russia
in the Khanates of Central Asia. They perceived this development as potentially
detrimental to British interests in the Indian Subcontinent.[2]
The term primarily denotes a
conflict between two or more nations, when the objective is to establish
dominance over other nations within a specific geographical area. During the
19th and 20th centuries, Central Asia and the Indian Subcontinent served as a
significant arena for power struggles between the British and Tsarist Russian
empires. Afghanistan, in particular, played a crucial role as a buffer state,
preventing direct conflict between these two powers.
In addition, the commencement of the significant game
occurred on January 12, 1830, when Lord Ellenborough, the esteemed President of
the Board of Control of India, issued a directive to Lord William Bentinck, the
distinguished Governor General, to initiate the establishment of a novel
commerce pathway to the Emirate of Bukhara. The British government formulated a
strategic plan to establish dominion over the Emirate of Afghanistan, with the
intention of transforming it into a protectorate. Additionally, they sought to
utilise the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Empire, the Khanate of Khiva, and the
Emirate of Bukhara as intermediary nations, positioned strategically to serve
as buffers between the British and Afghan empires. The implementation of this
measure will serve to safeguard India, as well as strategically significant
maritime trade routes against potential threats emanating from Russia. In
contrast, Russia put out the proposition of designating Afghanistan as a
neutral zone. As a consequence, Russia successfully annexed Khiva, Bukhara, and
Kokand.[3]
Hence, scholars in the field of history have seen the culmination of the Great
Game as transpiring on September 10, 1895, marked by the formalisation of the
Pamir Boundary Commission protocols. This significant event entailed the
establishment of a defined border between Afghanistan and the Russian empire.
Rudyard Kipling's novel Kim,
published in 1901, significantly popularised the word and provided novel
implications of rivalry among major powers. The popularity experienced a
notable increase following the commencement of the Soviet-Afghan war in 1979.[4]
According to Peter Hopkirk, the Russo-British contest for dominance in Central Asia escalated as the distance between their respective front lines gradually diminished, leading to an intensification of the Great Game. Notwithstanding the inherent hazards, primarily arising from confrontations
[1] Peter Hopkirk, “The Great
Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia,” (New York: Kodansha America
Inc, 1992). p. xv.
[2] Nargis Jan, “The Role of
India in new great game of Central Asia,” International
Journal of Science and Research, Volume 11 Issue 1, January 2022, p.
260.
[3] Nargis Jan, “The Role of
India in new great game of Central Asia.”
[4] Muzalevsky, R. “Unlocking India's Strategic Potential in Central Asia,” Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA Strategic Studies Institute, (2015), pp. 17-30. 6 Peter Hopkirk, Op.cit, pp. 4-5.
with antagonistic tribes and rulers, a notable absence of
intrepid young military personnel willing to jeopardise their lives outside the
territorial boundaries was not observed. These individuals had shown a fervent
enthusiasm to venture into uncharted territories, meticulously documenting
Russian military activities, and endeavouring to secure the loyalty of
sceptical Khans.6 In his literary work titled "The Great
Game," the author presented additional arguments. The Struggle for Empire
in Central Asia attracted not just professionals engaged in the Great Game, but
also a multitude of amateur strategists who avidly observed the events from the
periphery. These individuals offered their opinion extensively through a
plethora of books, articles, impassioned pamphlets, and letters to the Press.
The majority of these commentators and critics held very hawkish views and were
mostly pro-Russia. The authors contended that the sole means of halting the
progression of the Russian forces was through the implementation of proactive
strategies. This entailed achieving a position of advantage, either through
military invasion or by establishing cooperative buffer states or satellites,
strategically positioned along the anticipated invasion routes.[1]
The Great Game: Entering South Asia
The culmination of the
geopolitical rivalry between the Russian and the British empires in the 19th
century was marked by the acknowledgment of Afghanistan as a buffer state,
effectively, reducing the risk of direct confrontation between the two powers. As
a result, Afghanistan was designated as a buffer state following the signing of
the Treaty of Gandamak on May 26, 1879. This agreement was reached between Amir
Yaqub Khan, the ruler of Afghanistan, and the British. The treaty included
provisions that imposed stringent conditions, such as relinquishing control
over Afghanistan's foreign policy to London, consenting with the establishment
of British missions in Kabul and other locations, and ceding certain
territories near the Indian frontier, including the Khyber Pass, to
Britain.”[2] In
exchange for agreeing to the stringent terms outlined in the Treaty of
Gandamak, the Afghan Emir was granted assurances of safeguarding against
Russian interference and a recurring monthly payment amounting to 60,000
pounds. The enduring impact of the Great Game, with Afghanistan serving as a
focal point of struggle, continues to reverberate throughout Central, South,
and West Asia in the present day.
The Durand Line agreement was
established in November 1893, marking the border between British India and
Afghanistan. This agreement was negotiated between Sir Henry Mortimor Durand,
the British Indian Foreign Secretary at the time, and Amir Abdur Rehman, the
King of Afghanistan. The pact led to the declaration of Afghanistan as a buffer
state positioned strategically between the Russian and British empires.[3]
The historical trajectory of modern Afghanistan is characterised by a unique
and noteworthy pattern of being subjected to attack and occupation by three
erstwhile significant global powers: the British, the Soviets, and the
Americans. This distinguishes Afghanistan from other nations in contemporary
world history.
Post-Soviet Union
During the era following
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the methods employed to attain
influence in the 19th century and the present day exhibit notable disparities.
In the former period, influence was predominantly established through military
dominance over a specific territory. Conversely, contemporary strategies for
gaining influence involve fostering economic integration with a region, thereby
preventing other nations from utilising the said region in a manner that
contradicts their own national interests. Currently, the nations engaged in a
contest for regional dominance in Central Asia include the United States,
Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the European Union.[4]
Unlike the 19th century Great Game which reflected conventional use
of power and diplomacy, the new Great Game commencing after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and the emergence of Central Asian states independent of Moscow,
four major changes took place. First, the 19th century Great Game
was primarily between the Russian and the British empires as the two powers
wanted to expand and then contain each other. Second, the new Great Game
following the emergence of new Central Asian states in 1991, also involves
other powers namely the United States, Russia, China, India and Iran. Third,
with the application of information technology, soft power and globalisation,
connectivity gained momentum which gave a new
[1] Peter Hopkirk, Op.cit, 5-6.
[2] Peter Hopkirk, Op.cit, p. 385.
[3] Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan A history of Struggle and
Survival, New York: I. B. Taurus, 2004, p. 28.
[4] Sachdeva, G. (2006). “India’s attitude towards China’s growing influence in Central Asia and China,” Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.4, No.3, (2015) pp.23-34.
dimension and impetus to
competition and struggle for gaining influence in Central Asia. Finally, oil
and gas rich Central Asia, unlike the 19th century Great Game,
created new sources of attraction for existing players. New conflicts focusing
on resources became an essential feature of the new Great Game.
In this particular situation, the
emerging geopolitical competition in
Central Asia is primarily driven
by the pursuit of resource acquisition, particularly in light of the prevailing
energy crises in the region's vicinity. Pakistan has long held a historical
aspiration to establish connectivity with Central Asia, although it encounters
obstacles due to the prevailing circumstances in Afghanistan. The long-standing
project known as the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) gas
pipeline aims to harness and transport natural gas resources from Turkmenistan
to the South Asian region. Similarly, implementation of the "Central
Asia-South Asia" (CASA) project, which aims to facilitate the transmission
of energy from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to South Asia, has been hindered due
to the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan.
Unlike the19th century Great Game
in the 21st century, the struggle for influence in Central Asia is
based on conflict and cooperation. The old Great Game lacked technological
connectivity whereas in present circumstances, the players in the Great Game
are applying the tools of soft power like diplomacy, trade, aid and
investments. China, as the world’s second largest and India as the fifth
largest economy, are mindful of strengthening their influence in Central Asia
by pursuing cultural diplomacy and other forms of soft power. China’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) and its borders with Central Asia provide an edge as
compared to India thus putting it in a disadvantageous position. Therefore, a
new Great Game in Central Asia has begun. A number of players in the arena are
trying to compete for the attention of ‘five brides.’ It is not enough to
invoke the romance of old historical ties. If that be the case, Iran and Turkey
could claim much closer historical, cultural and linguistic kinship with these
states. Indian history does not take very kindly to the Central Asian
conquerors, especially the Muslim invaders who marched through the rocky
northwestern passes to rule her for centuries.[1]
Romance with Central Asia tends to get a new impetus with the Soviet
disintegration and the emergence of five independent states in that region
leading to new opportunities, competition and competition among players namely
India, Pakistan and China.
India’s Growing Role in Central Asia
Unlike Pakistan, India has an
age-old connectivity and influence in Central Asia. Due to its close
relationship with the then Soviet Union, India managed to make inroads in the
Soviet Central Asian Republics by developing cultural, educational and economic
ties.[2]
With the emancipation of Central Asia from Moscow, India embarked on its policy
to revitalise its ties with that region.[3]
Compatibility of perceptions between India and the newly-independent Central
Asian states on secular mode of governance; resisting Islamic extremism,
separatism and terrorism also made a difference for fomenting ties between the
two.
A lot of policy oriented research
in the Indian centers and institutes on Central Asia reflect New Delhi’s
serious approach on understanding a region, which since centuries had cultural,
historical and trade linkages with South Asia. For instance, in Jawaharlal
Nehru University (JNU), which is India’s premier federal seat of learning,
there is a Center for Central Asian Studies, which not only specialises on
contemporary Central Asia, but also offers languages and study of cultures of
that region. In University of Kashmir, Srinagar, there is a Center of Central
Asian Studies which was established in 1979, focusing on offering M. Phil/PhD
programme on Central Asia, and holds academic conferences/seminars/workshops.
It also works on interdisciplinary research projects connecting India and
Central Asia. The Center also publishes the annual research journal Central Asian Studies. Furthermore,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), based in New Delhi, is also
involved in policy-oriented research on Central Asia. Under Manohar
Parrikar-IDSA series, a book entitled Central
Asia Key to Engaging Russia written by Deepak Kumar was published.
[1] Maqsudul Hasan Nuri,
“India and Central Asia,” in Moonis Ahmar (ed.), Contemporary Central Asia (Department of International Relations,
University of Karachi and Hanns Seidal Foundation, 1995), p. 196.
[2] Moonis Ahmar,
"India's role in the New Central Asia," Pakistan Horizon 45:3 (July 1992), pp.57-70.
[3] Moonis Ahmar, “India’s relations with the Central Asian States: Pakistan’s Perspective,” in Riazul Islam et.al (eds.), Central Asia History, Politics and Culture (Karachi: Institute of Central and West Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 135-158.
India and the Central Asia
In the historical context, since
the days of Delhi Sultanate to the demise of Mughal Empire, the Indo-Central
Asian interaction was quite obvious and significant. However, with the
imposition of British rule in the subcontinent, and the advancement of Russia
in Central Asia to the borders of Afghanistan, that interaction began to
diminish. The Indian leadership after gaining independence from the British in
August 1947, gave attention to its ties with the USSR and its Central Asian
Republics. An example of this is when Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister
of India, embarked on visits to Central Asia in 1956 and 1961. These visits
facilitated an increase in engagement with the artists, scholars, vocalists,
and scientists. India and Central Asia have a long-standing historical
connection spanning over two millennia. The historical perspective reveals a
substantial degree of connectedness and cultural contact between the Kushan
Empire in ancient India and the Mughal Empire in medieval India. Cultural,
artistic and educational traffic thrived between the two countries, especially
with Uzbekistan, the most populated of the Central
Asian Republics, priding itself on its rich cultural and
Islamic heritage.[1]
Therefore, “these Muslim Republics, which formed an integral part of the new
defunct Soviet Union, saw India through the official prism of Moscow. India,
was for instance, seen as a leading Third World country in the forefront of the
Nonaligned Movement, active in world forums, a significant military and
industrial power, and a close and steady economic and strategic ally of the
Soviet Union. A large Muslim population which had shared historical memories
hardened the image of India as a secular, liberal, democratic and progressively
developing nation. Tagore, Gandhi and Nehru symbolised all that was noble, rich
and progressive in Indian thought and philosophy.”[2]
Historical linkages and
connectivity of India and Central Asia were narrated by S. K. Singh, former Indian
Foreign Secretary in the following words:
For
us, this region is full of historical memories: Places with evocative namesake
intimately tied up with India’s political, architectural, artistic,
intellectual and dynastic history. Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Khiva,
Khawarizm, Alma Ata, Ashkhabad, Kokand, are all parts of our medieval history.
All of us as young students heard of Babur’s beloved Farghana
Valley
and Andijan city, and his Uncle Ulugh Beg’s observatory in Samarkand. This
relationship with these people results today in children strongly attempting to
speak Urdu, or people in their houses singing snatches from our film songs.
These
republics are coming into their own as players in Asia’s South and West. This
is bound to make a difference, geopolitically and economically. India must, at
this time, show a genuine eagerness to assist advice and support them.[3]
Reconnecting India with Central
Asia, despite geographical impediments, got an impetus after the disintegration
of the USSR. India’s response to the emergence of independent Central Asian
states was swift and rapid.
According to an Indian journalist
S. Nihal Singh, “Unlike Pakistan, Indian stakes in former Soviet Central Asia
were immense because of decades of its ties with Moscow.” India has two major
advantages in the New Central Asia: first, it is a very familiar entity in that
region, thanks to close Moscow-Delhi relations and second, in trade and
commerce, India offers a mix of state and private enterprises which these
republics are seeking in bilateral relations. Indian expertise in the fields
like construction, banking, management, consultancy and hoteling is being
shared by the Central Asian states. India’s concern vis-à-vis ECO at that time
was that Pakistan was forging an anti-Indian alliance. Central Asia will remain
a prime concern of Indian foreign policy in the years to come. India's engagement
in the region extends beyond economic interests, as security and geopolitical
factors are expected to gain significant prominence in the future.
In May 1993, the former Indian
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao embarked on a diplomatic mission to Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan, two prominent nations situated in Central Asia. Moreover, during
the month of February in 1992, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of
Kazakhstan, visited India. Similarly, in February 1993, A. Abdullojanov, the
President of Tajikistan, undertook a visit to Delhi. The significant
advancement in India's expanding influence in Central Asia occurred when Prime
Minister Narendra Modi undertook visits to all the Central Asian states in
2015.
[1] Maqsudul Hasan Nuri,
“India and Central Asia” Opcit.
[2] Maqsudul Hasan Nuri,
“India and Central Asia.”
[3] S. K. Singh, “Born free with pains,” The Hindustan Times, February 15, 1992.
India devised the 'Connect
Central Asia' policy during the inaugural IndiaCentral Asia Dialogue held in
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2012, with the aim of enhancing its influence and
connectivity in the region of Central Asia. This policy primarily aimed to
enhance political, economic, and defense relations, as well as foster linkages
in the energy sector, between India and Central Asia. In 2017, India's
accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was facilitated by
Russia, signifying a significant stride towards enhanced regional engagement on
a comprehensive scale. Given China's existing presence in the region, India is
placing greater emphasis on actively interacting with the region through
various forms of diplomacy, such as economic, cultural, and trade initiatives.
In its essence, three common perceptions held by India and CAS are: political
stability, secular mode of governance and preventing religious extremism.
Likewise, India and Central Asian regimes share preventing three threats:
separatism, extremism, and terrorism. All the three strategic perceptions held
by India and the Central Asia states also form the core of Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. Strategic alignment of India and Central Asia could be gauged
from the fact that no regional country has actively supported Pakistan’s stance
on Jammu & Kashmir in any international fora.
The Pakistan factor holds an
eminent position in India’s Central Asian policy because of two reasons. First,
there is an age-old paranoia in New Delhi that Pakistan wants a friendly regime
in Kabul in order to get a geographical access to Central Asia. Afghanistan has
borders with three Central Asian Republics: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. Second, India holds the view that its controlled parts of Jammu
& Kashmir is in proximity with Gilgit & Baltistan, which is separated
from Tajikistan with only 16 kilometers of strip called Wakhan corridor.
Moreover, India possesses strategic interests in impeding Pakistan's continued
expansion of its geopolitical influence with the United States, Russia, and
China. The significance of this relationship is underscored by the United
States' reliance on Pakistan as a strategic partner in its efforts to defeat
terrorism. The United States has provided military support to Pakistan,
amounting to a value of $16 billion. Russia has initiated efforts to establish
a closer relationship with Pakistan, engaging in bilateral talks and
participating in multilateral discussions such as the Dushanbe summit, which
included Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, it has become imperative for
India to counteract the influence exerted by Pakistan. The Government of India
must implement substantial efforts to achieve a balance in response to China's
strategic and economic influence in the region, which is manifested by its
involvement in organisations like the SCO, economic trade relationships, and
investments in natural gas and oil pipelines. This is also taking into
consideration China's strategic approach known as the "string of
pearls" and its extensive presence in the aforementioned regions.
Therefore, it is of significant importance for India to ensure that Central
Asia does not succumb to the sole dominance of Russia and/or China.
The Islamic factor is considered
significant in influencing India's Central Asian policy from the perspective of
New Delhi. India's interest in this region is driven by the objective of
containing ‘radical’ Islam, which has the potential to create political
instability in the Central Asian Republics. This instability could then have a
spill-over effect on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and ultimately impact the
regions of Jammu and Kashmir. Among the five nations comprising Central Asia,
Tajikistan holds significant relevance for India due to its strategic
geographical closeness to Pakistan. India is highly attentive to the
developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main concern expressed is Islamic
fundamentalism. This concern extends not only to India, but also to other countries
such as Russia, China, and the European Union. The departure of NATO from
Afghanistan, coupled with any major political and military developments in the
region, has the potential to greatly amplify the movement for selfdetermination
in Jammu and Kashmir. India's strategic interests are critically tied to
political stability and the suppression of Islamic forces in Central Asia.
However, in the context of India being accused of religious persecution, namely
towards its Muslim minority during the BJP rule, it raises the question of how
New Delhi might employ the 'Islamic card' to legitimise its feeling of threat
from religious extremism and fanaticism in secular Central Asian states.
India's approach in Central Asia involves presenting itself as a secular
nation, while facing domestic criticism for the persecution of religious
minorities, particularly of Muslims.
Dynamics of India’s New Great Game in Central
Asia
India, presently positioned as
the fifth largest economy globally and with aspirations to ascend to the third
place in the global economy in the near future, aims to adopt a strategic role
in Central Asia, with a specific focus on enhancing trade, commerce, and
security relations. According to a certain perspective, the contemporary geopolitical
dynamics might be characterised as a "New Great Game," encompassing a
multitude of factors such as energy resources, trade relations, connectivity
initiatives, infrastructure development, ideological considerations, ethnic
dynamics, and even the phenomenon of terrorism. Previously referred to as the
"backyard" of the USSR, this region saw significant changes with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, resulting in the establishment of five
distinct and autonomous republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The post-9/11 era has seen a heightened level of
participation by the United States in the region, which further solidified the
presence of the New Great Game. Conversely, China, with aspirations for
regional influence, has expanded its involvement with Central Asia in recent
years. China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, aimed at revitalising the
historical Silk Road connecting China and Europe, will traverse the Central
Asian region, commonly referred to as the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic
Corridor. The lack of direct access to the ocean and major maritime shipping
routes in Central Asian countries poses a significant obstacle to trade flow.
In light of this, China's proposal to construct railways and develop road
infrastructure as part of the BRI has the potential to greatly enhance
connectivity in the region. Consequently, China stands to gain a favourable
position in this regard.[1]
Similar to the Indian Ocean, the struggle between China and India in Central
Asia carries favourable implications, as both prominent Asian powers aspire to
establish a cooperative relationship rather than engaging as adversarial
participants in the emerging geopolitical landscape. According to Nishtha
Kaushiki, the geopolitical significance of the Central Asian Republics (CAR)
has significantly increased for India. The significance of India's engagement
with the CAR and Afghanistan has been heightened due to various factors. These
include the abundant reserves of hydrocarbons, oil, and natural gas in the
region, China's strategic and economic dominance in the area, and the United
States' announcement of its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Consequently, it has become imperative for India to enhance
its strategic, political, and economic relations with the CAR and Afghanistan.
India's geostrategic interests in the region are influenced by the fact that
the Central Asian countries adhere to a moderate form of Islam. India's primary
concern is to prevent any of these nations from falling under the sway of
‘radical’ Islam, since this might potentially lead to the exportation of
terrorism to India. This is particularly significant considering India's
existing challenges with the secessionist movement in the Kashmir province. Given
the historical rivalry between India and Pakistan, India has concerns regarding
the political will and capability of Pakistan to ensure the protection of the
specific segment of the TurkmenistanAfghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline
that is intended to facilitate
India's access.”[2]
Therefore, an evaluation of
India's general strategy towards Central Asia can be conducted through an
examination of its Connect Central Asia Policy. The aforementioned strategy,
which was developed during the inaugural India-Central Asia Dialogue in 2012,
held in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, encompasses several significant
aspects of India's diplomatic ties with the Central Asian region. The text
discusses various aspects, including political interactions, economic contacts,
defense cooperation, and the establishment of connections within the energy
industry. During his policy statement delivered in Bishkek, the Minister of
State for External Affairs of India, E Ahmed, highlighted the significant
development of Central Asia's integration into the global economic and
political sphere over the past two decades, with a particular emphasis on
recent advancements. The trend of the increasing influence of Central Asia,
notably in the global energy sector, is viewed favourably in India. The Central
Asian countries are acknowledged as significant political allies within the
extended geographical vicinity. India's inclusion in the SCO in June 2017 is a
progressive move towards fostering stronger involvement with this particular
region. The SCO holds significant regional importance, as India was granted
observer status in 2005. India has demonstrated a noteworthy level of
engagement in the region, resulting in a significant increase in
government-to-government interactions. The aforementioned observation became
evident during the tenure of Prime Minister Modi, who embarked on a diplomatic
tour to all five Central Asian governments in July 2015. This marked the
inaugural occasion in which an Indian Prime Minister undertook visits to all
Central
Asian states subsequent to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union.[3]
[1] Parth Dave, “The great
game in Central Asia and its relevance-for India,” September 19, 2022, https://thekootneeti.in/2022/09/19/the-great-game-in-central-asia-and-itsrelevance-for-india/ accessed
on April 28, 2023.
[2] Nishtha Kaushiki, , Op.cit.
[3] Nargis Jan, “The Role of India in New Great Game of Central Asia,” International Journal of Science and Research, Vol. 11 No. 1, January 2022 Centre of Central Asian Studies, The University of Kashmir.www.ijsr.net accessed on April 28, 2023.
terrorism. Certainly, covert
Indian ambitions in Central Asia is to promote anti-Pakistan sentiments on
grounds of alleged involvement of Islamabad in cross-border terrorism.
Concealing its own poor track record of human rights, particularly anti-Muslim
drive, launched by BJP-Shiv Sena communal leaders is a shrewd Indian policy to
project its so-called democratic and secular image in Central Asia.
Conclusion
India’s road to Central Asia
passes through Islamabad and Kabul. Without normalising relations with
Islamabad and possessing normal ties with the Afghan regime, it will be an
uphill task for India to gain direct access to Central Asia. One can figure out
four major possibilities to analyse India’s role in the New Great Game in
coming years. First, in view of its surging economy and significant
contribution in information technology, Central Asian states will tilt in
favour of India for better connectivity in economic, commercial, trade,
cultural and strategic terms. Past involvement of India in Central Asia during
the Soviet days is a plus point for New Delhi.
Geographical impediment in
Central Asia-India connectivity will be neutralised because of New Delhi’s
trade with Central Asian states from the Iranian port of Chabahar.[1]
Till the time ties between India and Pakistan are normalised and Afghanistan is
stable, India will exercise the option of its connectivity with Central Asia
from the Iranian port of Chabahar. Second, strategic and security alignment of
India and Central Asia by combating extremism, separatism and terrorism, will
be a major reality in the days to come. In order to seek consonance with India
because of its economic clout, Central Asian states tend to ignore the surge of
religious extremism in India, particularly against Muslim minority. There is
also a question mark about Indian secularism, which contradicts with the
Central Asian secular mode of governance. The surge of Hindu nationalism under
state patronage undermines so-called credentials of Indian secularism. Third,
under the framework of SCO India will go an extra mile to strengthen its ties
with Central Asian members of the SCO. India will also try to make sure that no
Central Asian state takes a hostile position against India on the Kashmir
issue. So far CARs are not anti-Indian particularly on the issue of scrapping
Article 370 and 35-A. For CARs absorbing Jammu & Kashmir by the Indian
state will not make a difference because New Delhi, despite severe violation of
human rights in held Valley has been able to control the situation. The holding
of G-20 tourism conference in Srinagar in June 2023 is another message to the
outside world. It basically tried to project that India’s focus is on
development, peace and stability in its occupied parts of Jammu and Kashmir.
Age-old cultural and trade connections between Central Asia and the Indian
occupied Jammu & Kashmir is another source of future connectivity between
the two.
The Modi regime’s constant threat to Pakistan that India
will absorb Gilgit & Baltistan (G-B), which is located in the proximity of
Central Asia is reflected in New Delhi’s future ambitions in the region. How
far India’s ambition to absorb G-B in its fold like Jammu & Kashmir is yet
to be seen but it seems given New Delhi’s expansionist designs, such a plan is
surely on the cards. During his visit to occupied Kashmir in October 2022,
Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh expressed his aspiration for the
inclusion of Gilgit-Baltistan into India, aiming to fulfill the objective
initiated by the Modi government by the annexation of held Kashmir in August
2019. The assertions made by Singh pertain to a resolution from 1994 about
Gilgit and Baltistan that was adopted by the Indian parliament under the tenure
of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao.[2]
Finally, while focusing on
strengthening its economy and holding over global power, India embarks on a
long-term planning by augmenting its relationship with the friendly countries
of Central Asia. Vision and prudence in foreign policy, despite domestic
fault-lines, will enable the Indian state to sustain its proactive approach in
Central Asia and at the same time thwart Pakistan’s ambition to get a foothold
in that region.
[1] Soroush Aliasgary and Marin Ekstrom, “Chabahar port and Iran’s strategic balancing with
China and India,” The Diplomat,
October 21, 2021.
[2] “Indian Minister speaks of annexing Gilgit-Baltistan,” Daily Dawn (Karachi), October 22, 2022. Also see, “Eye on Pakistan: India will achieve its goals when it reaches GilgitBaltistan,” The Times of India (New Delhi), October 27, 2022.
promoting cooperation despite conflict, India and Central Asia can certainly make headway for mutually beneficial relationships. Pursuing an anti-Pakistan stance and using its influence to use Central Asian states against Islamabad will not help India.n
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